The right to divorce is a recent invention in most of the world and a contested one in a substantial part of it. For most of human history, dissolution of marriage was either impossible (Catholic Europe before the Reformation, much of Hindu and Christian Orthodox practice), available only to husbands (classical Islamic talaq, classical Roman law), or available only by special legislative act (England before 1857). The transformation began with the Protestant Reformation, accelerated through the French Revolution and Napoleonic codification, gained momentum through nineteenth-century liberal reform, and culminated in the late-twentieth-century global wave of no-fault divorce. The current global map is uneven: most of Europe, the Americas, and East Asia permit no-fault divorce by one party's choice; large parts of the Middle East and South Asia retain fault-based or gender-asymmetric regimes; the Philippines and the Vatican prohibit divorce entirely; Malta legalized it only in 2011; Ireland only in 1996.

The legal architecture of divorce sorts into four broad types. The first is no divorce — marriage as indissoluble except by death or annulment. The second is fault-only divorce — dissolution requires proof of a specific marital offense by one spouse (adultery, cruelty, desertion, imprisonment). The third is no-fault on consent — dissolution by mutual agreement after some waiting period. The fourth is unilateral no-fault — either spouse can dissolve the marriage at will after a procedural waiting period, regardless of the other spouse's consent or the reason for the request. The American system since the 1970s combines fault and no-fault in most states, with no-fault as the practical default. The European systems vary, with some retaining fault grounds for property or support consequences while permitting no-fault for the dissolution itself.

Herma Hill Kay's history of California's 1969 Family Law Act — the first true no-fault statute in the US — is the canonical account of the transition. The California Governor's Commission on the Family, on which Kay served, concluded that fault-based divorce produced perjury, collusion, and unnecessary cruelty. Couples seeking to dissolve uncontested marriages were forced to manufacture grounds. Witnesses were paid to testify to staged adultery. The system corrupted everyone who touched it. The 1969 Act replaced fault grounds with "irreconcilable differences" and "incurable insanity" as the only bases for dissolution. Within fifteen years every state had followed in some form, and by 1985 the fault-only divorce had vanished from American practice as a primary mechanism.

The consequences were profound and contested. Lenore Weitzman's 1985 study The Divorce Revolution argued that no-fault divorce systematically disadvantaged women, particularly women who had spent the marriage in domestic labor. Under fault regimes, the innocent party could leverage the threat of denial-of-divorce or unfavorable property division. Under no-fault, that leverage vanished. Weitzman's specific statistical claims — that women's standard of living fell 73 percent after divorce while men's rose 42 percent — were later partially retracted as overstated, but the underlying observation that no-fault weakened the bargaining position of the financially weaker spouse has held up in subsequent research. The reform fixed the perjury problem and created a new distributional problem.

The collective effects sort along several dimensions. Divorce rates rose sharply after no-fault reforms, peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and have declined since. The post-1980s decline reflects later marriage, more selective marriage, and a smaller marrying population — the people who marry now are more compatible at the outset because the population is smaller and more deliberate. Marriage durations have lengthened conditional on marriage. The proportion of marriages ending in divorce stabilized around 40-45 percent and may be falling.

The global map is shaped by religious establishment as much as by liberal legal reform. Catholic-majority states retained restrictive divorce regimes longest. Italy legalized divorce in 1970 and survived a 1974 referendum to repeal. Spain legalized in 1981. Portugal in 1975. Argentina in 1987. Chile in 2004. Malta in 2011. The Philippines remains alone among non-Vatican states in prohibiting divorce. Annulment, which is dissolution on the ground that no valid marriage was ever formed, has functioned in some Catholic-majority jurisdictions as a workaround. The Catholic Church's own annulment process has expanded under Pope Francis's reforms, particularly the 2015 motu proprio Mitis Iudex, which simplified the process.

Islamic divorce regimes operate on a different architecture. Classical talaq permits the husband unilateral dissolution by pronouncement. The wife has access to dissolution through khula (compensated divorce), faskh (judicial dissolution for cause), or stipulated grounds in the marriage contract. Modern reforms in Tunisia, Morocco, and Turkey have moved toward judicial supervision and gender equalization. The triple talaq in instant form was outlawed in India in 2019 after decades of contestation. Iran and Saudi Arabia retain more traditional asymmetric structures, though both have made marginal reforms.

The collective question that divorce regimes answer is who controls exit from intimate union. No exit means the state and the religious establishment control. Mutual-consent exit means the parties jointly control. Unilateral no-fault means each individual controls. The trend over two centuries has been toward individual control, with the corresponding trade-off being that individuals exposed to abandonment must rely on post-divorce remedies (alimony, property division, child support) rather than on the threat of denial-of-divorce. The institutional design choice is whether to protect the marriage or to protect the parties; the modern consensus has shifted decisively toward the parties.